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TALENT AGENTS AS PRODUCERS: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SCREEN
ACTORS GUILD REGULATION AND THE RISING
CONFLICT WITH MANAGERS
Koh Siok Tian Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the entertainment industry, talent has always required agency
representation.1 The necessity for such representation is clear. Producers
have vested interests in securing the services of creative talent for the
2lowest possible price and under the least onerous terms to the producer. In
order to limit production costs, producers' eyes are trained to the bottom
line. Their business acumen and negotiating abilities may easily intimidate
a creative person whose training and natural abilities are of a different
world.
Enter the agent. Representation of creative talent, in particular actors,
includes a multiplicity of tasks. First and foremost, the agent has always
negotiated and continues to negotiate the basic terms of the deal.3
Traditionally, the agent assumed the role of nurturer, and provided actors
with advice and assistance in career development.4 For example, the agent
* LLB University of Western Australia, 1964; admitted to practice in Perth, Western
Australia, 1966, United Kingdom, 1972, California, 1979. Koh Siok Tian Wilson is a former
entertainment law attorney. Attorney, motion picture legal department, Warner Bros. Inc, 1977-
81. The views expressed in this Article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those
of any firm, corporation or union.
1. See Donald E. Biederman, Agents v. Managers Revisited, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 5,
6 (1999) (quoting telephone interview by Daniel A. Cohen with Robert Wachs, Mar. 1, 1999).
2. See Milton Barnes, A Dog's Life For A Composer, THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 25, 1989,
at J6. But see Victor P. Goldberg, Essay, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 524, 538-
40 (1997). It may financially benefit a producer to hire expensive talent if the talent will increase
the success of the motion picture, therefore increasing the likelihood that the producer will be
offered other projects at increased fixed compensation. Id. Although such a plan decreases the
producer's share of net profits of the film by employing an actor who takes a greater share of
these profits, it may benefit the producer in the long run. Id.
3. Amy Wallace, Hollywood Agents Lose the Throne, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, at Al.
4. See id. See generally, Stephen P. Clark, Note, Main Line v. Basinger and the Mixed
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helped the actor to prepare materials for submission to casting directors and
production companies, helped make choices when multiple offers were on
the table, introduced the client to the studios and producers, handled the
media and coordinated public appearances.5 However, over time, agents
have increasingly confined themselves to the central task of sending the
actor out for roles and negotiating the terms of the resulting deals.6 For
assistance with other aspects of their careers, actors have employed
personal managers and a variety of other professionals, such as lawyers,
business managers and publicists.7
These additional representatives come at quite a considerable cost to
the actor. A personal manager generally charges between ten to fifteen
percent of the actor's income. 8 Lawyers charge either their hourly rate or
five percent of the actor's income.9  Business managers charge an
additional five percent.' 0 Publicists charge a fee on a monthly basis in the
range of $1500-$3000." Only the highest paid actors can afford all of
these services but even less-established actors often find it necessary, at the
very least, to employ a personal manager.
Personal managers perform a wide range of activities. They offer the
beginning actor counsel on breaking into the business and are often the
means by which an agent is procured.' 2 For the experienced actor, they
serve as a sounding board and offer expertise and help on aspects of
sustaining and/or reviving a career.1 3 For the star, blessed with an array of
personal assistants and professional help, the personal manager has become
by and large a personal producer. 14 Certain personal managers have built
Motive Manager: Reexamining the Agent's Privilege to Induce Breach of Contract, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 609, 628 (1995) (stating that agents handle "every facet" of their clients' careers).
5. See generally, Clark, supra note 4.
6. See Heath B. Zarin, Comment, The California Controversy Over Procuring Employment:
A Case for the Personal Managers Act, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 927,
934-35 (1997); Wallace, supra note 3.
7. See Wallace, supra note 3; Neville L. Johnson & Daniel Webb Lang, The Personal
Manager in the California Entertainment Industry, 52 So. CAL. L. REv. 375, 381 (1979).
8. James M. O'Brien III, Comment, Regulation of Attorneys Under California 's Talent
Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CAL. L. REV. 471, 483 (1992);
Zarin, supra note 6, at 941.
9. See id. at 486 (listing six types of fee arrangements typically used by attorneys in the
entertainment industry: 1) hourly billing; 2) annual or monthly retainer; 3) flat fees; 4) percentage
of artist's contract; 5) percentage of artist's income or 6) percentage of the lawyer/artist
partnership).
10. Zarin, supra note 6, at 938.
11. Telephone-Interview with Dale Olson, Publicist, Apr. 6, 2001.
12. See Zarin, supra note 6, at 937-40.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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substantial movie and television production businesses by using the
enormous clout of the star talent to which they have unique access. As a
result, conflicts with agents have arisen. This Article explores the origins
of this conflict and provides a historical perspective for presently existing
tensions.
II. BACKGROUND
Fewer restrictions govern personal managers than agents.' 5 In
addition to statutory law, 16 the agency business is regulated by the Screen
Actors Guild ("SAG") pursuant to the Codified Agency Regulations or
Rule 16(g). 17 To represent any member of SAG, an agent must be
franchised by SAG and meet the requirements of the Agency Regulations.
8
An important aspect of the Agency Regulations are the rules prohibiting an
agency from possessing various kinds of financial interests that would,
among other things, transform them into producers and employers of
actors.' 9 There is no similar prohibition for personal managers whose
ascendancy has been a comparatively recent phenomenon.
A. History of the New York Agency Regulations
The earliest attempt to regulate the agency business occurred in New
York in 1910 as a result of hard lobbying by members of the American
Federation of Labor, a group of vaudeville performers calling themselves
the White Rats of America.20  At the time, the New York Employment
Agency Act required that all agencies submit copies of their contract forms
for prior approval to the Corporation Council of New York. 2' This law also
regulated the amount agents could charge in commissions.
In 1928, the United States Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey
22law that was similar to the New York Employment Agency Act. The
decision left agents unregulated as to the amount they could charge in
15. Id. at 941-42.
16. California Labor Code provisions govern both managers and agents. Some federal
statutes impacting the business as well. However, a discussion of these provisions is beyond the
scope of this Article.
17. Johnson & Lang, supra note 7, at 412-13.
18. Id. at 413-14.
19. Seeid. at 417.
20. Valerie Yaros, AGENCY TIMELINE (2000) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review) [hereinafter AGENCY TIMELINE]. Yaros is the historian for the
Screen Actors Guild.
21. Id.
22. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
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commissions. This was the catalyst for New York Actors Equity
Association ("Equity") Council to approve a licensing system. 24 Agents
were required to obtain a permit from Equity in order to conduct business
with Equity and its members.25 The permit regulated the amounts agents
charged in commissions. 6 The court in Edelstein v. Gillmore finally
silenced challenges to the Agency Regulations by affirming the right of
Equity to regulate agencies.27
B. The Inception of the Screen Actors Guild
In 1925, an attempt by producers in California to pass legislation to
regulate agencies was forestalled by the timely action of West Coast Equity
representative, actor Wedgwood Nowell. 8 The text of a telegram sent by
Nowell to Frank Gillmore of Equity is illustrative:
Unexpected private information received late. today reveals
attempt being quietly made to railroad through Sacramento
legislature bill known as Senate Bill six hundred thirty one
introduced by Senator Pedrotti January twenty third and referred
to Committee on Labor and Capital pending final action
February twenty third. This amendment relates strictly to agents
representing persons seeking theatrical or other artistic
employment including motion picture acting. It first stipulates
no agent association club or corporation etcetera shall represent
actor unless agency possesses signed written agreement with
actor. Then it provides that agent must likewise possess signed
written agreement with producer also or else agents vocation
becomes illegal. Have copy of Bill complete. Portion
compelling agent to possess written agreement with manager or
producer highly pernicious in its future aspect and forms real
reason for Bill. Plainly apparent intent of those fostering Bill is
to legally provide for existence of but one agency in future
presumably to be operated either openly or secretly by picture
producers who will naturally withhold necessary written
agreement from all agencies excepting their own. Undoubtedly
Producers Association promulgating this legislation in order to
centralize into one agency and curtail salaries. Players
23. See id.
24. H.A. Artists & Assoc., Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 707 (1981).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 709-10; see also Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F.2d 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
27. Edelstein, 35 F.2d at 726; see also AGENCY TIMELINE, supra note 20.
28. See id.
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absolutely at their mercy if Bill carries. Furthermore ambiguous
wording of Bill may later be so interpreted as to inhibit Equity's
economic representation of members unless we possess written
consent from each manager. Although I believe Equity should
never operate agency we nevertheless should utilize every
endeavor to halt this legislation or producers will own players
body and soul and forbid forever their joining Equity.
Represents rankest form of class legislation and we now perhaps
may understand the reasons behind long silence of Hays *29 who
is still dodging and probably awaiting outcome at Sacramento
before seeing me and turning down future relationship. May I
fight this issue immediately with every possible means I can
hurriedly summon.
30
On a May evening in 1933, the idea for SAG was born.3 1
The new SAG was soon strengthened by a further attempt by
producers to exert control over actors. SAG was founded to "gain fair
economic conditions for actors ... [and develop a] better understanding
and cooperation among the producing, talent and craft groups of the motion
picture industry. 32  In 1933, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and
Sciences developed the first code to govern relations between producers
and talent.33 By a grand subterfuge, the producers secured a code provision
that placed a $100,000 cap on the salaries of actors, directors and writers,
and another that mandated the licensing of agents by producers.34 This
caused a mass exodus of well-known talent from the Academy 35 who then
29. Will Hays was the former head of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of
America, now known as the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"). Encyclopedia
Britannica, Motion Picture Association of America, at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?
eu=55320 (last visited Apr. 1, 2000).
30. Telegram from Wedgwood Nowell, Representative, West Coast Equity, To Frank
Gillmore, Actors Equity Association (Feb. 18, 1925) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review).
31. Ralph Morgan & John C. Lee, The Guild: In the Beginning-An Idea Goes to Work,
SCREEN ACTOR, Sept. 1941, at 18 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law
Review). SAG was formed as the result of a meeting between six actors including Ralph Morgan,
who became SAG's first president. Id. at 18-19; Keith Collins, Reeling in the Years, DAILY
VARIETY, Mar. 8, 2001, at 6. Articles of Incorporation were filed on June 30, 1933. Roger
Armbrust, Performers United, BACK STAGE, Dec. 17, 1999, at 25.
32. Morgan & Lee, supra note 31, at 18.
33. AGENCY TIMELINE, supra note 20.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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joined the newly formed SAG, setting it on its way to becoming a major
industry force.36
In 1939, after one year of negotiations, SAG adopted the Agency
Regulations. 37  The Regulations required agents apply to SAG for a
franchise, and forbade them from producing films. 38 This marked the first
appearance of the financial interest rules currently in dispute.39
The financial interest rules prohibit agents from becoming motion
picture producers and narrowly limits their participation in television
production.40 They also essentially prevent agencies from owning an
interest in, or being owned by, production companies or distribution
companies. 41 However, a provision within the rules allows for agents to
"package" productions.42 Packaging a production calls for an agent to
entice a particular combination of key talent to work on a production.43 In
such a case, the talent, if represented by the packaging agent, will not pay a
commission to the agent.44 The agent instead receives a commission as a
percentage of the production budget and its profits, which may afford the
agent a far greater return than if the agent were simply to receive the
standard commission.45 However, in practice, only the major agencies are
able to package.46
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also John Brodie, CAA Earn-Out Reflects Changes Ahead, DAILY VARIETY,
Sept. 18, 1995.
38. AGENCY TIMELINE supra note 20.
39. See id.
40. SAG CODIFIED AGENCY REGULATIONS RULE 16(g) § XVI(B) (Nov. 1, 1990)
[hereinafter SAG RULE 16(g)]. SAG RULE 16(g) § XVI(B) provides that "[a]n agent or an owner
of an interest in an agent shall not be an active motion picture producer... [or] finance the
production... except as provided... of a television motion picture series." Id.
41. Id. § XVI(A)(7). SAG RULE 16(g) § XVI(A) states:
[o]ther than herein permitted, no person, firm or corporation engaged in the production
or distribution of motion pictures or owning any interest in any company so producing
or distributing, shall own any interest in any agent, directly or indirectly, nor shall any
such person, firm or corporation share in the profits of the agent.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. § V(A)(7).
44. SAG RULE 16(g), supra note 40, § V(A)(7)(a)(i), V(A)(9).
45. See id. § V(A)(5), (6).
46. William A. Birdthistle, A Contested Ascendancy: Problems with Personal Managers
Acting as Producers, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 493, 502 (2000) (stating that the four major
agencies-William Morris Agency, Creative Artists Agency, International Creative Management,
and United Talent Agency-dominate industry package awards).
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C. The Prohibition on Agencies Acting as Producers
In 1952, SAG granted the first of several waivers to Music
Corporation of America, Inc. ("MCA"), which allowed MCA, then an
agency representing talent, to produce television programs through its
subsidiary, Revue Productions.47 With its unique access to talent, MCA's
television production business flourished. By 1960, MCA became the
principal producer and seller of network television productions and
packages, earning an additional $9.5 million more in revenue than its
nearest competitor, the William Morris Agency. 8 In June 1962, MCA
acquired a controlling interest in Decca Records, Inc., whose subsidiary
was Universal Pictures Company, Inc. ("Universal").49
On July 13, 1962, the Justice Department filed a complaint against
MCA alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act")
and the Clayton Act.5 SAG and the Writers Guild of America ("WGA"),
each of which had granted similar waivers, were named as co-
conspirators. 5' The suit was settled later that same month by an agreement
that MCA would divest itself of its agency business. 52 In its place, MCA-
Universal would sign talent to exclusive term contracts, commonly referred
to as "slave" contracts, under which the studio would pay a guaranteed sum
for the duration of the contract.
3
In May 1981, further support for the agency franchising system came
from the Supreme Court 4 A group of agents brought suit against Equity
alleging the agency franchising system violated the Sherman Act.55 The
court found that labor unions, acting in their self-interest and not in
combination with non-labor groups, enjoy statutory exemption from
Sherman Act liability, and thus rendered judgment for the Union.5 6 The
peculiar nature of the industry, whereby union members rely on agents to
secure employment and those agents' fees are calculated as a percentage of
47. Id. at 522; Manohla Dargis, The B-Side of Hollywood's Golden Age, L.A. WEEKLY, Oct.
1, 1999, at 64.
48. DENNIS McDOUGAL, THE LAST MOGUL: LEW WASSERMAN, MCA, AND THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF HOLLYWOOD 229-30 (Crown Publishers, Inc.) (1998).
49. See DAN E. MOLDEA, DARK VICTORY 206 (Penguin Books) (1986); see also
MCDOUGAL, supra note 48, at 296.
50. McDOUGAL, supra note 48, at 300; MOLDEA, supra note 49, at 207.
51. MOLDEA, supra note 49, at 207.
52. McDOUGAL, supra note 48, at 300-01.
53. Seeid. at 313.
54. H.A. Artists & Assoc., Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. at 704 (1981); see also
AGENCY TIMELINE supra note 20.
55. H.A. Artists & Assoc., Inc., 451 U.S. at 711.
56. See id. at 721-23.
20011
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the member's wage, makes it impossible for the union to defend the
integrity of the minimum wages it negotiates with the producers without
regulation of agency fees.57 The agents are considered part of the union's
labor group, and agency regulations are clearly designed to promote the
union's legitimate self-interest.
58
IV. THE EMERGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST: MANAGERS AS PRODUCERS
Since 1981, the agency business has continued to change in the
manner described in Part I. Agents have become dealmakers, and thus
actors have increasingly turned to personal managers to fill the gap. State
legislation prohibits managers from soliciting employment or negotiating
deals, 59 but the unique nature of the business has resulted in many instances
where the lines are not clearly drawn. Additionally, managers are not
subject to the same financial interest restrictions that govern franchised
agents.6 ° Consequently, managers use the clout of the celebrity talent they
represent in their self-interest to produce motion picture and television
productions.61 Some of these management businesses are enormously
profitable, and in one case, has led to the buyout of a firm for a substantial
figure.
62
Agents see vast financial opportunities just out of reach and now wish
freedom from the financial interest restrictions. Two of the main agency
groups, the Association of Talent Agents ("ATA") and the National
Association of Talent Representatives ("NATR"), have mounted a vigorous
and acrimonious campaign to pressure SAG to grant a broad-ranging
waiver of the restrictions.63 However, this is opposed by a majority of
SAG membership, who anticipate that serious conflict of interest issues
57. Id. at 721.
58. Id. at 722.
59. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.4, 1700.5 (West 1989 & Supp. 2001); see also O'Brien,
supra note 8, at 495 (quoting Report of the California Entertainment Commission to the Governor
and Legislature 6 (1985)) (submitted pursuant to Act of Aug. 31, 1982, ch. 682, 1982 Cal. Stat.
2814, 2816, repealed by Act of July 17, 1984, ch. 553, 1984 Cal. Stat. 2185 (effective Jan. 1,
1986)) (stating "[o]ne either is, or is not, licensed as a talent agent, and, if not so licensed, one
cannot expect to engage, with impunity, in any activity relating to the services which a talent
agent is licensed to render").
60. See SAG RULE 16(g), § XVI(B); see also Johnson & Lang, supra note 7, at 418 (citing
Rock Tycoon, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1978, at 40).
61. See Johnson & Lang, supra note 7, at 418.
62. See Carl di Orio, IPG Buys Bragman: PR and marketing Finn Sold to Global
Consortium, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 5, 2001, at 7 (discussing buyout of Bragman Nyman Cafarelli
Public Relations & Marketing by global communications consortium Interpublic Group on
undisclosed terms).
63. See A Report on the ATA/NATR Negotiations, 242 SCREEN ACTOR 3 (Jan. 2001).
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will arise if such a waiver is granted. SAG supports its members' concerns
and understands the problems such a waiver would confront under state and
federal legislation.
64
The ATA and the NATR assert that the industry has changed and that
the financial interest rules are antiquated and no longer applicable. 65 It is
true that enormous changes have occurred in structure since the financial
interest rules were first enacted in 1939.66 However, the agency regulations
have served agents and union members through many changes and
fluctuations in the industry. At this time, with non-"A-list" actors' salaries
suffering a precipitous plunge, there is an even greater need for strong and
independent representation. The financial interest rules assure that agents
work for their clients.67 Such an assurance cannot be as effective if agents
also become their clients' employers.
A paper circulated in February 2000, when SAG members were first
alerted to the waiver issue, makes evident some of the conflict of interest
concerns:
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Screen Actors Guild has come within a hair's breadth of
instituting changes in your relationship with your agent which
effectively leave you totally unprotected in your contractual
negotiations with producers.
If these changes are finalized what it will mean is that agents
will be allowed to cross over the line between being actors
representatives and being producers. Agents will be able to do
the following;
own a financial interest in motion pictures and television
programs
> own interests in production companies
> engage in distribution and financing of motion pictures
> sell their agencies to companies engaged in the
production distribution and financing of motion pictures
64. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.4, 1700.5.
65. Letter from Karen Stuart, Executive Director, ATA & NATR, to SAG Franchised Talent
Agents (May 24, 2000), at http://www.agentassociation.com/negotiations.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2001) (stating "the negative economic impact on any business working under antiquated work
rules and outdated financial constraints can be disastrous"). Id.
66. See infra Part II.B.
67. See SAG RULE 16(g), §§ 1(c), XVI(B), XVI(F).
2001)
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Your agent will have a financial interest in direct opposition
to yours.
A smoke screen of apparent "safeguards" has been agreed to
by the agents but these have no bite
they cannot be "active motion picture producers" but
they can still have a business and financial interest in
opposition to yours
> they cannot own a controlling interest in production
companies but they can still own a substantial interest
which will be directly in opposition to yours
> they cannot be directly owned by the traditional studios
or networks but they can be owned by a company
affiliated with the studios and networks like MCA,
AOL/Time-Warner Inc. or Viacom. This will make your
agency a sister company of the studio or network with
whom your agent is negotiating your deal
> they must disclose their interest to each client who is to
be employed by an interested company. And then what
do you do with that information? Demand that the agent
divest his interest? Leave the agency? And go where? To
another agent who is owned by another company with
whom you might need to do business?
> their fiduciary obligation to their client is not to be
impaired i.e. they must still negotiate the best deal
possible for you. In the real world this will be virtually
impossible to enforce given that so much about a deal is
negotiated verbally or by unwritten and even unspoken
understandings.
> the actor may seek independent counsel or representation
at the cost of the agent. You must go against your own
agent and risk the consequences. You must additionally
find someone who is competent and does not have his
own conflict of interest issues, as many law firms do.
That person must be brought up to speed on all of your
needs and requirements and the history of prior
negotiations. That person additionally is to negotiate with
your agent who has a history with you and knows all of
your weaknesses and vulnerabilities and who now is
effectively your potential employer. That person's fee is
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to be paid for by your agent, which divides his loyalties.
To top it all you still pay your agent his 10% commission.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
1) What happens if you have to sue or if you are sued by, say,
Paramount and your agent is owned by Viacom which owns
Paramount? Your agent will have vital information that will
assist your case but who is to tell what pressures will be brought
to bear on him by virtue of his association in that family of
companies. Can you be sure that he has disclosed to you all
information which will be of use to you? Can you be sure that
his memory of the deal will be in accord with yours? How do
you establish that concessions made were fairly negotiated? This
is the person in whom you placed your confidence. Now it is a
question of your word against his. Who will prevail? Who will
you get to reinforce your contentions?
2) If these changes go through agents will be able to enter
into partnerships with internet and new technology companies
who will produce and distribute motion pictures over their
networks. The attraction for these companies will be the
product which they can get. That product comes from you, the
talent, BUT the agents are not going to be negotiating the same
ownership interests for you as they will for themselves. Their
plan is to tie up certain chosen talent to a long-term commitment
in return for some licensing and merchandising royalties and
then, on the strength of those commitments, negotiate an
ownership interest for themselves in the company involved.
You will end up working for your agent for a small piece of a
pie which was all yours to begin with.
3) One stated objective of these changes was to ensure a
greater number of agents would remain agents. In fact it will
ensure entirely the opposite result. Once established as owners
of internet and new technology companies agents will have no
more need to be agents. Furthermore, those premium agencies
which are bought out by the major holding companies in our
industry will have a lock on their product and the smaller
agencies will be shut out.
2001]
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4) If your agency is owned by one of the major companies it
will be in its interest to see that you never see a script from
another company. You will effectively be shut out of all
productions for other companies unless they make a deal with
your agent's company. Shades of the old studio system and
"slave" contracts except that you will be paying a commission
for the privilege.
5) The changes are being made in the form of a two-year
waiver of the existing conflict of interest rules in the Agency
Regulations. Any agreement entered into between the agent and
any other company during that period of two years will remain
in force after the two years is up. Of course there will be a
stampede to complete their deals before the two years is up and
then at the end of that period we will have a totally transformed
landscape to deal with and one in which actors will have no one
protecting their interests.
6) The ATA have a problem with managers who operate
without the restrictions which are placed on agents. First of all,
this is a problem which was created when agents became deal-
makers and ceased to concern themselves with the development
of their clients' careers. Clients were referred to personal
managers who took an additional percentage. Then the demands
of careers required the addition of lawyers, business managers,
publicists and so on, all for additional chunks out of the actor's
income. It is no answer to this problem to create a situation
where actors income stands to be further diminished by the
conflicting financial interests of their agents. If agents wish to
disenfranchise they must do so and run the risk of having to
return commissions whenever a disgruntled client sues them
under the California Labor Code for wrongfully soliciting
employment. We can work together to find an answer to this
problem or go to war but the waiver is the wrong way to go.
7) The people most affected will be those actors who earn the
most. Young actors who get hot will never know how it is that
they are not getting the salaries that equivalent situations have
yielded up to now and established talent can be made to believe
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that their marketability has diminished or conditions have
changed and hence their remuneration. It is the highest salaries
that there is the most interest in reducing and your own agent
will be the means of doing so. As those salaries are reduced so
also will the lower scales of remuneration be squeezed even
further.
THESE CHANGES DECLARE OPEN SEASON ON
ACTORS
With a conflict of interest of such magnitude there can be
no assurance that arms-length transactions will be
negotiated.
In return for these considerable concessions the ATA has made a
number of vague undertakings to assist SAG in various problem
areas such as organizing the new technology companies,
runaway production, performer salary compression and diversity
of employment. None of these undertakings bear any assurance
that these problems will be resolved. In fact, in the case of the
new technology companies the agents have made a completely
separate and contradictory statement that they do not consider
themselves bound at all by the Agency Regulations in those
areas.
An alignment between the agents and the entertainment
conglomerates has very clear anti-trust implications particularly
with regard to the effect it could very well have on major actors
salaries. The Justice Department takes a very keen interest in
any appearance of collusion and price-fixing within an industry
and on the face of it implications might very well exist here to
initiate an investigation.
Should an investigation be commenced by the Justice
Department, SAG itself could well come under scrutiny and this
may have some onerous results. The ATA have refused to
indemnify the Guild against any legal consequences arising from
the acceptance of their proposals. They may have had more
reason for their refusal than was contemplated by our advisors.
2001]
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Hopefully the Board will reconsider the proposals and vote
against the waiver. By all accounts the Board has not previously
been fully apprised of the nature, consequences and dangers of
these proposals.
The Board also has the option to call a referendum and Article
XI, Section 7 of the Constitution and Bylaws requires
membership ratification for changes that affect commissions or
the nature of the income commissionable. Waiver will cause a
profound shift in agent/client relations with far-reaching effects
on members income. It alters fundamentally the basis on which
commissions are paid. Actors will be impacted for years to
come and with consequences also for the whole creative
community. There is exposure here to law suits which could
impact on SAG and conceivably also individual members of the
Board. This alone suggests that the prudent course would be to
seek membership ratification rather than to unilaterally approve
waiver.
68
The SAG Board did, in fact, reconsider the proposals and found that
"relaxing financial restrictions would create a conflict of interest, since the
actor's agent could in effect become the actor's employer."69 The ATA
and the NATR responded some months later with an additional set of
modifications, 70 but these modifications did not solve the basic problem.
Currently, the parties are at an impasse and the outcome remains unclear.
A fifteen month grace period, which began in November 2000, is in
progress. 71 At the end of this period the ATA and the NATR agencies
stand to lose their franchises with SAG.72 Other agencies that are not
members of those groups continue to operate under their SAG franchises.73
68. Summary of Conflict of Interest from Koh Siok Tian Wilson to the members of the
Screen Actors Guild (Feb. 2000) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review).
69. See A Report on the A TA/NA TR Regulations, supra note 63.
70. Id.
71. Roger Armbrust, For Unions, 2000 Proved To Be the Year of Strike, and More, BACK
STAGE, Dec. 29, 2000, at 25.
72. See A Report on the ATA/NATR Regulations, supra note 63, at 7 (stating "SAG expects
to enter into independent discussions with non-ATA, non-NATR talent agents shortly").
73. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Agency Regulations have served both the agencies and SAG and
their respective members well during their long history. They have
provided a measure of security to actors who today can confidently contract
with their agents knowing certain protections exist. The agents have
prospered with their guarantee of exclusive representation. The financial
interest restrictions have enhanced, rather than detracted from, their
position as brokers between talent and management. Agents have become
major power brokers in the industry and command handsome salaries.
Some have gone on to top executive positions at major motion picture and
television companies. It is tragic that the success of personal managers has
created such a severe strain on the actor-agency relationship. Pressure is
rising for a new approach to regulating the personal manager. A
breakdown in the important alliance between actor and agent has far-
reaching implications for the industry.

